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COURT OF APPEALS 
November 18, 1987 
HAND DELIVERED 
Mr, Timothy M. Shea 
Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: First Security Financial, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. Okland Ltd., Inc. , Defendant and Appellant, 
Case No. 860314-CA (Utah Supreme Court Case No. 
21032) 
Appellate Court Rule 24(j) regarding Citation 
of Supplemental Authorities. 
Oral Argument set for Monday, November 23, 1987 at 
9:00 a.m. 
Dear Mr. Shea: 
This letter sets forth certain pertinent and significant 
recent authorities that have come to the attention of counsel to 
Okland Ltd., Inc., in accordance with Court of Appeals Rule 24(j) 
In particular, the case of Colonial Leasing Co. vs. Larson 
Bros. Const. Co., 49 Utah Adv. Rpts. 4, (12/22/86) is entirely 
dispositive and controlling. A copy of such Utah Supreme Court 
decision has been attached for that reason. Okland believes 
this case is identical in regard to factual issues such as an 
oral option to purchase leased equipment, liquidated damages and 






Colonial Leasing Company v. Larson Bros. Co., 
731 P.2d 483; 49 Ut. Adv. Rpts. 4, (12/22/86) 
(holding that whether a lease is intended as a 
security for sale, is a question to be determined 
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the nature of the document raising questions of 
fact precluding summary judgment; holding that 
§70A-2-201(l) of the UCC does not bar parol evi-
dence intended to prove that an apparent lease 
transaction is in fact a sale? holding that the 
Statute of Frauds under §70A-2-201(1) of the UCC 
does not prevent a party from proving the true 
nature of the agreement between the parties as 
that is what is at issue and does not bar parol 
evidence proving that an apparent lease transac-
tion is in fact an unconditional contract of sale 
or a present sale.) A copy is herewith attached. 
Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat. Bank, 737 P.2d 225; 56 1, 2, 
Ut. Adv. Rpt. 26, (04/28/87 (holding that because 19-24 
a summary judgment is granted as a matter of law 29-35 
rather than fact, the Supreme Court is free to 
reappraise the trial court's legal conclusions.) 
Gump & Ayres v. Domcoy Investors V, 733 P.2d 128; 1, 2, 
51 Ut. Adv. Rpts. 8, (01/29/87) (holding on review 19-24 
of a motion for summary judgment and in 29-35 
construing contractual language that the Supreme 
Court need not defer to the trial court, but 
affirms the trial court so long as contract terms 
are complete, clear, and unambiguous.) [Emphasis 
added.] 
Valley Bank & Trust Co* v.Rite Way Concrete If 2, 
Forming, Inc., 64 Ut. Adv. Rpts. 66, (09/6l/87) 19-24 
(reversing summary judgment based on genuine 29-35 
issues of material fact as to whether the guaran-
tor was released from liability to the extent of 
the injury for failure of the creditor to protect 
its security interests, citing Atlas, 737 P.2d 
229; the court, in reversing summary judgment, 
added that any ambiguities in an instrument must 
be resolved against the drafter when it purports 
to establish liability against a guarantor^) 
Mr. Timothy M. Shea 
November 18, 1987 
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First American Commerce Co. v. Washington Mutual 1, 2, 13 
Savings Bank, 66 Ut. Adv. Rpts. 19 (09/21/87) 19-24, 
(reversing grant of summary judgment and remanding 29-35 
the matter to trial court in order to determine 
intent of parties and other factual issues.) 
[Emphasis added.] 
Madsen v. Murrey & Sons Co., Inc., 66 Ut. Adv. 2, 13, 
Rpts. 32, (09/29/87) (holding that the lower court 24-26, 
did not err when it concluded that the seller had 
a duty to mitigate its damages and failed to do 
so.) 
Allen v. Kingdon, 39 Ut. Adv. Rpts. 3, (07/29/86) 2, 13, 
(after ^ trial, applying the Warner test ofi 21-22, 
liquidated damages, held such provision in 31-35 
agreement is unenforceable because there must be 
reasonable relationship to actual damages.) 
[Emphasis added.] 
Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193, (01/30/84) 2, 13, 
(Utah case holding that plaintiff's claims were 21-22 
not for a sum certain and under Rules 55(b)(2) and 24-26 
54(c)(2)y a hearing should have been conducted by 31-35 
the trial court to ascertain the amount of damages 
to which the plaintiffs were entitled as courts 
are not at liberty to deviate from these rules.) 
The following additional cases decided subsequent to 
Appellant's brief involve summary judgment or the error of a 
lower court after trial which involves facts similar to the 
at bar and which compel reversal of the lower court's summar 
judgment. 
Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Mining, 60 Ut. Adv. 
Rpt. 27, (06/27/87). 
Conder v. Williams, 61 Ut. Adv. Rpts. 23, (Ct. of 
App.) (06/25/87). 
Mr. Timothy M. Shea 
November 18, 1987 
Page Four 
Weber v. Springville City, 725 P. 2d 1360; 42 Ut. 
Adv. Rpts. 35, (09/17/86). 
Robinson v. Intermountain Healthcare, IncL, 62 Ut 
AdvT Rpts. 21, (07/21/87). h 
Christiansen v. Holiday Rent-a-Car, 66 Ut. Adv. 
Rpts. 15 (amended opinion replacing pricbr opi-
nion 58 Ut. Adv. Rpts. 26), (05/29/87). 
Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Co., 38 Ut. Adv. Rpts. 8, 
(07/17/86). 
Williams v. Singleton, 39 Ut. Adv. Rpts. ^ 6, 
(08/05/86). 
Also attached is a copy of page two of the Equipment 
Lease in issue as it was inadvertently omitted from both 
Appellant and Respondent's briefs, although it is in the lower 
court's record (R. 3 reverse). 
JMC/tp 
y for Appellant Okland 
cc: Kyle Jones, Esq., Counsel for Respondent 
Leonard W. Burningham, Esq., Co-counsel for Appellant 
Attachments 
Cite as 
49 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 
IN TH£ SUPREME COURT 
OF tHE STATE OF UTAH 
COLONIAL LEASING COMPANY OF 
NEW ENGLAND, INC., a Massachusetts 
corporation, dba Colonial-Pacific Leasing 
Company, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
LARSEN BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION 
CO., a general partnership; Michael Ray, 
Larsen and Jody Earl Larsen, individuals; 
Michael Ray Larsen and Jody Earl Larsen 
Brothers Construction Company, 
Defendants and Appellant. 
No. 193S4 
FILED: December 22, 1986 
THIRD DISTIRCT 
Hon. Judith M. Billings 
ATTORNEYS: 
Royal K. Hunt for the Defendants and 
Appellant 
L. Edward Robbins for the Plaintiff and 
Respondent 
STEWART, Justice: 
Plaintiff Colonial Leasing Company trans-
ferred possession of a heavy piece of constr-
uction equipment called a crawler-loader to 
defendant Michael Ray Larsen pursuant to a 
document called a "lease." Larsen defaulted 
on the payments required by that document, 
and the plaintiff sued for damages. The trial 
court granted Colonial Leasing summary 
judgment on its claim for $27,716.10, the 
I amount due under the document, less the 
j proceeds of a sale of the equipment after 
I plaintiffs repossession, plus costs and atto-
i rney fees. On appeal, Larsen argues that the 
document was a security agreement subject to 
the filing requirements of Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code. Since Colonial 
! failed to comply with Article 9 requirements 
| in disposing of the collateral, Larsen cont-
ends that Colonial was therefore precluded 
I from recovering a deficiency judgment. In 
granting summary judgment, the trial court 
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stated in a minute entry: "Affidavits are not 
admissible and are barred by statute." We 
reverse and remand for further proceedings. 
On September 23, 1977, Larsen obtained 
the crawler-loader from Colonial on a 60-
month "lease/ Colonial had purchased the 
loader from a supplier specifically for Larsen. 
The "lease' contains an integration clause 
and expressly requires return of the equip-
ment upon expiration of the lease term. In 
May, 1980, Larsen defaulted and the equip-
ment was repossessed and sold for $6,000. 
Larsen filed affidavits in opposition to the 
motion for summary judgment stating that at 
the time the "lease* was entered into, it was 
the trade, custom, and usage in the business 
to accord lessees an option to purchase leased 
equipment at the end of the lease for its resi-
dual value and that Colonial had orally 
granted Larsen an option to purchase at the 
end of the "lease period" for the residual 
value of the equipment of approximately 10 
percent. 
The basic legal issue at stake here is 
whether the transaction was a lease or a sale 
of the equipment. When a commercial trans-
action for the acquisition of equipment is in 
the form of a lease but in fact is intended to 
be a sale, the payments, even though called 
"lease payments," are legally considered 
installment payments on the purchase price. 
At the end of such a "lease," there is either a 
nominal payment required to exercise the 
option to purchase or a final payment which, 
although sizeable in relation to the value of 
the goods, leaves the lessee no economic alte-
rnative but to exercise the option. See, e.g., 
In re Vaillancourt, 7 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 
(Cailaghan) 748 (Bankr. D. Me. 1970); In re 
Washington Processing Co., 3 U.C.C. Rep. 
Serv. (Cailaghan) 475 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 
1966). 
In granting Colonial's motion for summary 
judgment, the trial court ruled that parol 
evidence of an option to buy was inadmiss-
ible, apparently because of the parol evidence 
rule and the statute of frauds. On appeal, 
Larsen claims that the trial court, pred in 
ruling that Larsen's affidavits .alleging the 
existence of an oral option to purchase the 
crawler-loader were inadmissible on the 
motion for summary judgment. Larsen also 
asserts that the terms of the lease itself indi-
cate that the parties really intended a sale and 
security arrangement rather than a lease. 
I. STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides that affidavits in support 
of or opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment must set forth such facts as would 
be admissible in evidence at trial. Horton v. 
Blackham. 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983). Colo-
For coapfcte Utaa Code Aoootatioos, 
nial claims that the Uniform Commercial 
Code, specifically U.C.A., 1953, §70A-2-
201(1) (1980 ed.), precludes evidence of an 
oral agreement between the partieY Section 
70A-2-201(l) states: 
Except as otherwise provided in this 
section a contract for the sale of 
goods for the price of $500 or more is 
not enforceable by way of action or 
defense unless there is some writing 
sufficient to indicate that a contract 
for sale has been made between the 
parties and signed by the party 
against whom enforcement is sought 
or by his authorized agent or broker. 
Colonial relies on In re Financial Computer 
Systems, Inc., 474 F.2d 1258 (9th Cir. 1973), 
a case virtually identical to this case, for the 
proposition that §70A-2-201(l) bars parol 
evidence intended to prove that an apparent 
lease transaction is in fact a sale. In that case, 
an equipment lessor tried to reclaim from the 
lessee's bankruptcy trustee two airconditio-
ning units which it had leased to the lessee. 
The trustee refused to turn over the units, 
claiming that the lease was in reality a secu-
rity agreement and void because the lessor 
had not filed a financing statement. At the 
referee's hearirtg, the trustee was allowed to 
present evidence of an oral option to purc-
hase the equipment at the end of the lease. 
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed, 
holding that admission of the oral evidence 
violated Cal. Comm. Code §2201(1) (West 
1964), which is identical to §70A-2-201(l). 
The court, hjowever, failed to consider the 
effect of Cal.j Comm. Code §2102, which 
states that "th|is division [Article 2 of the 
U.C.C.J applie^ to transactions in goods; it 
does not apply to any transaction which alth-
ough in the fo^ m of an unconditional cont-
ract to sell or (a) present sale is intended to 
operate only a$ a security transaction." Our 
code has a Virtually identical provision, 
§70A-2-102, t6 the California provision. 
Whether the statute of frauds provision 
contained in $70A-2-201(I) applies, there-
fore, is directljf dependent on whether this 
transaction was a lease or an "unconditional 
contract to sell ^r (al present sale." The trial 
court in the instant case did not adjudicate 
what the true nature of this transaction was. 
Section 70A42-201(I) is not the only 
statute of frauds which might apply to this 
case. U.C.A., 1953, §25-5-4 (1984 ed.) 
states: 
In the following cases every agree-
ment shall be void unless such agree-
ment, or some note or memorandum 
thereof, is in writing subscribed by 
the party to be charged therewith: (1) 
every agreement that by its terms is 
— — 1 
**mlt CodctCo'i AoootatkMi Service. 
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not to be performed within one year 
from the making thereof. 
Even if applicable generally to transactions of 
the type involved in this case, §25-5-4(1) 
does not exclude the oral evidence in this 
case. Statutes of frauds are intended to bar 
enforcement of certain agreements that the 
law requires to be memorialized in writing. 
E.g., Howell v. Inland Empire Paper Co., 28 
Wash. App. 494, 624 P.2d 739 (1981). But 
statutes of fraud do not prevent a party from 
proving the true nature of the agreement 
between the parties when that is what is at 
issue rather than enforceability. Golden v. 
Golden, 273 Or. 506, 510, 541 P.2d 1397, 
1399 (1975). See also Bennett Leasing Co. v. 
Ellison, 15 Utah 2d 72, 387 P.2d 246 (1963). 
In accord with that rule, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in 
Woods-Tucker Leasing Corp. v. Hutchcson-
Ingram Development Co., 642 F.2d 744 (5th 
Cir. 1981), held that oral evidence of an 
option was admissible to shed light on the 
nature of an agreement between the parties, 
and specifically to show that it was a sale. Id. 
at 746 n.5. Woods-Tucker also expressly 
disavowed the holding in In re Financial 
Computer Systems. See also Bennett Leasing 
Co., 15 Utah 2d 72, 387 P.2d 246, where this 
Court held that even though an unsigned 
automobile lease for a term of twenty-four 
months was unenforceable, that the underl-
ying oral agreement between the parties was 
admissible to show the rental value of the 
automobile in an action for quantum meruit. 
In this case, the statute of frauds did not 
bar Larsen from proving what the parties had 
intended, since Larsen sought only to obtain 
the protections of Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, not to enforce an unwri-
tten term of the contract. Nor was Colonial's 
action for a deficiency judgment on the lease 
payments an attempt to enforce the oral 
option against Larsen. 
II. PAROL EVIDENCE RULE 
The Parol Evidence Rule serves to exclude 
evidence of terms in addition to those in a 
written integrated agreement. *[TJhe rule 
operates in the absence of fraud to exclude 
contemporaneous conversations, statements, 
or representations offered for the purpose of 
varying or adding to the terms of an integra-
ted contract/ Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 
P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985). See also Eie v. St. 
Benedict's Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190, 1194 
(Utah 1981); Bullfrog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 
28 Utah 2d 261, 266, 501 P.2d 266, 270 
(1972); Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53 
Yale LJ. 603. 609 (1944). Because the parol 
evidence rule applies only if the writing was 
intended by the parties to represent the full 
and complete agreement of the parties, the 
trial court must first determine whether the 
writing was intended to be an integrated 
agreement. Union Bank, 707 P.2d at 665; 
Eie, 638 P.2d at 1194; Bullfrog Marina, 28 
Utah 2d at 266, 501 P.2d at 270. In some 
cases, it will be necessary for a trial judge to 
rule on the issue of integration as m prelimi-
nary or foundational matter. See fialloran-
Judge Trust Co. v. Heath, 70 Utah 124, 258 
P. 342(1927). 
In this case, the trial judge did not expre-
ssly rule whether the purported lease was an 
integrated writing. Since the affidavits raise a 
factual issue as to whether the contract was in 
fact intended to be integrated, the trial judge 
will need to hear the evidence on that issue. 
Indeed, the need for parol evidence is also 
suggested by the nature and terms of the lease 
itself and the surrounding circumstances. 
Larsen also argues that the terms of the 
lease itself indicate that it was meant not as a 
true lease, but as a security agreement for the 
sale of the property. In some cases, such a 
judgment may be apparent from the face of 
the document, but in other cases, the basic 
nature of the agreement, judging solely from 
its contents, may be ambiguous. It is the 
general rule that if an agreement is ambig-
uous because of lack of clarity in the meaning 
of particular terms, it is subject to parol 
evidence as to what the parties intended with 
respect to those terms. Faulkner v. Farnswo-
rth, 665 P.2d 1292 (Utah 1983). See also 
Rainier National Bank v. Inland Machinery 
Co., 29 Wash. App. 725, 631 P.2d 389 
(1981). We hold that that rule also applies 
where the character of the written agreement 
itself is ambiguous even though its specific 
terms are not ambiguous. Bown v. Lovciand, 
678 P.2d 292, 297 (Utah 1984); W.M. Barnes 
Co. v. Sohio Natural Resources Co., 627 
P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 1981); Hansen v. Kohler, 
550 P.2d 186, 188-89 (Utah 1976); Woods-
Tucker Leasing Corp. v. Huthcson-Ingram, 
642 F.2d 744(5t{i Cir. 1981). 
Numerous factors bear on determining 
whether the terms of an agreement show that 
it was meant to be a lease or a security agree-
ment. Among others, those factors are 
whether (1) the lessor is a financier, (2) the 
lessee is required to insure the goods in favor 
of the lessor, (3) the lessee bears the risk of 
loss or damage, (4) the lessee is to pay the 
taxes, repairs, and maintenance, (5) the agre-
ement establishes default provisions gover-
ning acceleration and resale, (6) a substantial 
nonrefundable deposit is required, (7) the 
goods are to be selected from a third party by 
the lessee, (8) the rental payments were equi-
valent to the costs of the goods plus interest, 
(9) the lessor lacks facilities to store or retake 
the goods, (10) the lease may be discounted 
with a bank, (11) the warranties usually 
found in leases are omitted, and (12) the 
For complete Utah Code Annotations, see Code • Co's Aaaotatloa Service. 
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goods or fixtures are impractical to remove. Christine M. Durham, Justice 
J. White & JL. Summers, Handbook of the Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice 
Law Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
 H o w c % j u s t i c C t COIlcurs i n t h c r c $ u k 
at 882-83 (2d ed. 1980). To the extent the _ _ _ _ ^ 
above factors are tei*ms of the lease agree- ' 1 f 
ment, their probativeness will depend in some 
instances on how they are phrased. 
Many of these factors are present in this 
lease. Under the lease, Larsen was to select 
the equipment and choose what supplier 
Colonial would obtain it from. All warranties 
by Colonial were excluded. Larsen was requ-
ired to insure the crawler-loader in favor of 
Colonial and to pay ail taxes. He also bore 
the risk of loss. The lease contained default 
provisions governing acceleration and resale. 
The trial judge in this case did not address 
what these provisions indicated as to the 
intent of the parties or whether the terms 
were ambiguous, therefore necessitating the 
admission of parol evidence to ascertain the 
intent of the parties. 
Larsen relies heavily on FMA Financial 
Corp. v. Pro-Printers, 590 P.2d 803 (Utah 
1979), for the proposition that the oral evid-
ence should have been admitted in this case. 
FMA recognizes that despite an integration 
clause in the form lease involved in that case, 
the lease was in fact a sale. At trial, FMA 
admitted that it routinely offered lessees an 
option to purchase the equipment at the end 
of the lease term. The Court held that this 
admission rendered the integration clause 
ineffective and that the oral evidence was 
admissible. In any event, the agreement in 
this case, for an oral option, if any, is not 
inconsistent with the express terms of the 
agreement. Although no such admission has 
been made in the present case, appellant has 
alleged an oral option consistent with indu-
stry custom and trade in the affidavits, and 
that is sufficient to create an issue of fact. 
Only when contract terms are complete, 
clear, and unambiguous can they be interpr-
eted by the judge on a motion for summary 
judgment. Morris v. Mountain States Telep-
hone A Telegraph Co., 658 P.2d 1199, 1201 
(Utah 1983). If the evidence as to the terms 
of an agreement is in conflict, the intent of 
the parties as to the terms of the agreegieat is 
to be determined by the jury. Id.; Amjacs 
Interwest, Inc. v. Design Associates, 635 P.2d 
53, 55 (Utah 1981). In sum, whether a lease 
was intended as security for a sale is a ques-
tion to be determined on the facts of each 
case, as is the issue of whether the nature of 
the document raises questions of fact that 
preclude summary judgment. FMA financial 
Corp., 59<kP.2d at 805. 
Reversed and remanded. Costs to appel-
lant. 
WE CONCUR: 
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice 
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Miittactory 10 tataor. and taaaae tnaii dettvet tna pottciet oi mautance to taaaot 
»a L i tMS. T A I l S tt»taa»nan».aapEqwiomant tree ana ciaar ol an it».»a •>•"» anoancumo<ancat •nctuO.ngnui not «>m.t*fltopef»onaiP'00»M, a»*at»m»ntt F^nrer t e t t e a t n a » ta) mane and ''»a 
at* o«cia'«<ont * n ] ' e i u m t in connection «.in a*1 cnargat a n o i a i a t >ocai nata and tadarai «n<cn m a / n o * o* narea't* 'ba impotao joon or meatu ' to py m« ownertn.p taatnq f»mai ta«e purcnata 
s o t t e t f o ^ or u*# o i£qwpm*nt raciud>ngno«reverai i t«»*tonormeatU feooy t a i t o r tnet <ncome iotoay an sucncnarges ana ta»a* anqtct kwbm.t *< . t i tnprooi !Ot»t»or upon rtQ^eti of taaaor of 
1 ' L f iSOM ft PATMtMT n i.«ttee ta<it to procure or ma.nta.n taid mturanca ot 10 0itcn*rge Mid levitt lien* and anc^mprancet or to pay Mid cnerget and i&iea taaaor tnati n*c me ngnt but 
man not oe ooi-gateo to 001*.r tu^n mtwrmca ateci tucn o^tcnarge 01 pay tucn cnarget and taaet in mat a«ent testae man repay to tetMX tne cott tnereo' piwa inte'ett morion at U S per an-
ftwff witn tne nex payment o' 'ent 
t8 MOCMNtTT u t i tee man inoemnity tetaor aga<nti ano now te t tor nermiett <rom any and en ctaimt actiont proceeding! eapenaet damagee and iieeon»et including anorney a tee* anamg 
•n connect.o^ «iin £qu lpme«t mciudmg *itnout nm»tation itt tewction pwfenate menuiactwre delivery potMt t ion ute operation qr return m d tne racovary ot daime unoa* mauranee pofcciea on 
Equipment 
tfc A t t t O M M t M l . OMfteTT /t.tnout taaaor t pr.or written content tataee mat) not tat aM.gn. tranttet. ptadge n,potnecate or otnerwiM d i tpoM oi tn.t w e M Egw.pment qr any mere* ! ifterem. * 
o> » j t i« i o' * " 0 Eaw.pm»r«! q» permit ,t to oe wtefl oy anyone otner men taaaee ot teaaee t employte» 
t t t t c - -r*, a t t a r m i eate tmo o< mortgage Equipment m »no*e o* in pan. witnout nonce to testae Eacn twen assignee and or mortgagee man n«»t an ot tne ngrt t out none at tne 
C L I . Q * : . O ' i :• Ltsso' - i q « - m t wate t e t t e e man not a t M n agatntt aMignee tno 01 mortgagee my oafanM counterclaim or ottwt mat tataee may nave agemtt tataor Notw.mttanding any tucn 
es».«rment Lesto' *«»iani» mat uattee tn»u quietly enioy u M 0' tne tou.pment tuOtact to tne tarme m d condition* of tr><t >eate agreement Suotact to tne foregoing, m.t teaee tn*t— to ma oenetit of 
*' z t c - C " 9
 wpon m* ne>rs legatees pertonai repretentanvet successors and att ignt ot tne paniet nereto 
20 l i f t V t C E CMAAGI ANO i M T H t f t T . it t e t t e e ta<tt to pey *n*n due my rent or otner amount required r*t*sn to oe paid 10 tataor taaaaa anatt pay 10 taaaor a terv.ee cntvga oi nva pat cent t $ v l 
ci ««.n . •*•«.,<•»*-.! or pan tnerect '0 ' «n.cn M > 0 rent or otner amount matt oa delinquent o r U M wntcnever >• greater ptua m w a t t on tucn dannqwem ram or otner amount trom me Oue data meraoi 
ufi.i f,a.c at me ' t ' » o> H'< per annum 
)' O f f AULT <a< it lataee !»<•» to pay mn*n sue my rent or otner amount required nerem to oe paid by t e t t e e ot if tesaee fe<ta to pdrtorm my otner provition nereof witmn ten not oaye arte* 
i¥M— 11..' •'^ r> a t f - f u * 1 ! <« * " i . r g per'o'rwarct inered or i t io ran y , t ason v.esteama»asaoui»transtt'OiEQuiomtntof m«eniory orotnerwiMcon«enstoan> oneorany nonce o tMUureoy m y tea . 
" 5 * , t " c f i> •' * o#» 'on •% t 'eo Oy or tga'"»i L t s s e e u n ^ r *n« 8a«»ruptcy Act or •' t tssee nar- oreacnedany otn#r e a t e o ' agreement oetween tasse« *"di.esso« tataor snaima«e me ngnt to eae»-
P I Lessor may 'ecove< from Lettee aii rents and otner amountt men due ano as mey man mereatier oecome sua n*n\jno* 
..,, iasv < ma, a«a postett-o" o< my or an temt o» Equipment «nerever tame m»f oe ioca:eo ».tnoui demano or "Otjce ••tnout m y court oroe' or otne* process 01 iaw and w.tnoui iiaoiiity to 
L I " > V ' 'o> r"i carnages occa»>oneo 0, sucn taamg ol possession Ary $ucn taxing of possess.o" sna>i not continue a te'minanon o' tnis teese 
(••'i testo ' may immediately recover »»om t e t t e e w in reaped to m y and ait items of Equipment and *i<n or witnout reooaaatting Equipment tne accewratad and totai turn of an rant and otne* 
»
r v . . " ' t ou« «/-<] 10 oecome awe provded noweve* mat upon taposMttion or surrender ol Equipment te t tor may ten or otnerwiM dispose ot Equipment <*nn or «nnout notice and on puenc or 
t"i.aie o a ana appiT ^e -at prrxeaus mereot alter oeduenng alt t>pontes 'including attorneys feet mcurred m connecton merewtn aa requited by i«w o* >n equity 
1 vi i.assor may Pursua any otner remedy at ia« or <n equity 
c< A « « w larrr.u.ai.o-i nereu' der »nan uccur only upon nvritten notice by Lessor to tetaee m d on>> wrtn retpect to sucn , etjn or nems ot Equipment at t e t t e r epecif'Caiir electa to terminate >n aucn 
no; cr * z .o< ' i . c " 'ttrr% as f t acceptaoie to Ltsso< Eacapt at to sucn item or iiemt «nn 'aspect to wnicn mere <s a termination tms wate man com.nwe n tuii force tno effect and taaaaa man be 
oc;.r}*i*o [i (Mr'c'm JM acts aro 10 pay • • ' rent and Other amountt required under tn.» tease 
.v s< • ^ " o- 'emeo, nr><e" Lor-'e<'«d upor o' reserved to Lessor <s ««ciuvive of any omer ><gntor remedy ne<e<n o« o> ta« oi equ t, pr«« oed o» permitted Out eacn man oa Cuiiutan«e 0' eve<> otner 
i.gnt &i -err^c, a'»er. ne' t -na«" oi now or neteatter taistmg at taw or m equity o* by statute o* otner*ise m d may be |snte«eo conc«"entiy tnerewitn o* trom t.me to time 
i? t i S S O A • I X t * C N M i . essee men pay testo* an costs and eapentes including reasonable att«xneya tees me tees o' conecnon agencies m d ome> atpentet twen aa lerepnone and tetegiapn 
.':*• ,v i -c-rreo ty ta»so' «''v'C'ng any o» tne teimi conamont or provisront ricreoi »netner incurred oeiore or atte* |udgment 
2j OtarNCJSNa* *CMtONAL f>*10PtNT* Equipment is and snatt at an limes remam me property o< Lessor m d Lessee snail nave no ngnt i.tie or miereti tnerem or mereto eacept m aapreaaiy se: 
fcrm ^' <r \ .rav» Equipmen* it m d snen at an times oe m d iomtn oeftonei property notwunumding mat Equipment o* tr)f pen tnereot may now oe or nentettar become m m y monrm attiaad or at 
tar la's 10 real pre party or my building tnereon 
;4 NOTlCf ft Serv.ca o' an written notices unoe< tins tease man oe i-iiiCi«ni ,1 gi««n personally or matted 10 trie pan, >n«oiyed at ns respective adoveta set loan aoove o* at sucn otne* address at 
tai<3 pan* rr.ay p'Ovidc >n writing trom nme to time Any such nonce maned to said address snatt oe * i tec i *e «nen deposited <n me unaed States meii duty addressed and *<m uoetage prepeio 
?"> i f C u n t t T OCfOSiT n Lessor net required a sec or . N deposn nom t e t t e e Letso* mey but tnm not oe oongateo 10 appty tne security depom to cme my detautt of taaaae hereunder m wnicn 
e.t Ltts«« snati ^'omptiy i t» i^-t me security oeposn to me tun amount spetined aoove Upon term>n*non ot mis wate and an renewait nereot it t e t t e e net tuttiiteo an tne terma and condmona 
nere^i tasttv man latum 10 Lessee m y remaining baiece o> the security deposn actuany made by tessee 
2i f f t tNO Oft AtCOftOtNO. Tne parties nereto 00 not mtend tnu teese to oe and n is noi a conditional sates contract cnanei mortgage or security agreement w.m.n tne memmg ot any atatuie 
' • 3 . " "g i,i,n<)
 a< recordation thereof Q< ot any notice or statement «.m itsoeci tne«eto Nevertnetett trut *eate may be to t<wd 01 >ecoto to give notice to interested parses v.t»*ee nereoy gives taaaor 
authority to eaecute and complete m y tucn nonces including financing statements filed pursuant to me Uniiorm Commercial Code >n benatl of m d as agent loi t e t tee 10* ta<d purpoeet 
2 ' MOOif iCATtON Tr . t tease conttiiMtes tne entire agreement between te t to r m d Lessee and tupercedet an p*e.<ous repratentanont negonationt or converMtions between tne parties m d can 
01.y ot changed aiterad and modified eacapt as eapressiy stated h**em py a written and signed document by 00m Lessor and tessee 
f 
?% MtSCCLLAMf OUS **o p*o*ie»on of * n wate c m be waived eacept by the written content ot Lessor Lessee snan provide Less©* —in sucn corporate retotunont opinions of counMi tinenoai 
statements and tme* oocumemt at te t tur man request from nme to nme 11 more m m one tataee i t nemed >n mit teate me nao.- 'r ot eacn snan be icnt and several if Lesto* so requeatt. taaaae 
t h a i eaecute turn documents et te t tor men require to* fnmg or recotdmg Tne paragrepn t.tios ere .mended soieiy lor me conven.enca of tne pamet nereto Tn.t e w men oe governed by tne tew 
oi me State oi Ulan 
29 JURISDICTION. T-v» contract ma" be governed by the iaw of tne state ot titan end <n me event of oeiauit man oe unoe* tne 3rd JuONcun Court in and tor me state ot mar, 
A. 3 reverse 
